ing in the funding, directing, and conducting of scientific research, and together they are spending billions of tax dollars. That is a lot of money and a lot of science. We refer to these and related facts as "government's significant involvement in science." 1 Scientific research has enormous potential to change our lives. Science influences government decisions about what medicines to approve, what agricultural and energy technologies to promote, and what consumer products to allow on the market. Research on the genetic engineering of agricultural products may have widespread effects on the health of ecosystems and humans as well as on global socioeconomic systems. The future genetic engineering of human beings could bring about changes that radically alter our species. Research into nanotechnology has a wide range of potential impacts, ranging from advances in clean energy and remediation technologies to new forms of body armor and virtually undetectable surveillance devices. In these areas and others-such as artificial intelligence, geoengineering, psychopharmaceuticals, weapons systems, robots, viruses, and so forth-the potential effects, for good or ill, are dramatic. We refer to these observations as "science's significant effect on the public."
These points are uncontroversial. There is another observation of the same feather that we can label "public ignorance." one kind of public ignorance that is often studied-and repeatedly confirmed-in the field of public opinion research concerns the typical voter's astounding lack of knowledge about government's structure, operation, officeholders, policies, and their effects.
2 While there are some people who, by dint of their education, training, talents, careers, and so forth, have a certain expertise when it comes to politics and government, most people do not. This contrast between the knowledge of experts and the general public appears in the domain of science as well. For example, the National Science Foundation reports:
Surveys conducted in the United States and Europe reveal that many citizens do not have a firm grasp of basic scientific facts and concepts, nor do they have an understanding of the scientific process. In addition, belief in pseudoscience (an indicator of scientific illiteracy) seems to be widespread among Americans and Europeans. Studies also suggest that not many Americans are technologically literate. (2004, 2.7-15) Notice that the ignorance here is doubly thick: first, owing to political ignorance, the public does not know much about what kinds of scientific [ 85 ] practices government institutions are involved with, and second, even if the public did know what kinds of scientific practices its institutions are involved with, it would not in general have the wherewithal to really understand such research.
Where do these three observations-government's significant involvement in science, science's significant effect on the public, and public ignorance-leave us? Taken together, they appear to pose a problem for democracy. For it is unclear how the people are ruling themselves when the institutions over which they are supposed to have control are funding or taking part in activities they do not know about or would not understand if they did but that will nonetheless seriously affect their lives. one needn't have a particularly robust conception of democracy to think this is a problem.
3 However, the situation is much more complex than it initially appears. Under the right circumstances, citizens have displayed impressive abilities to get "up to speed" on scientific issues that concern them and to contribute effectively to public forums and community-based research projects (Brown and Mikkelsen 1990; Epstein 1998; NRC 1996) . Moreover, scholars have pointed out that many of the crucial scientific and technological issues that citizens need to address do not so much involve technical details as broader issues related to environmental injustice, involuntary impositions of risk, failures of scientific research to meet genuine social needs, and manipulations of scientific information by powerful interest groups (Kitcher 2011; oreskes and Conway 2010; Wynne 2005) .
Given this complexity, there is much to be explored about the problematic relationship between scientific expertise and democracy. Because the problem arises from a possible conflict between the exclusiveness of expert knowledge and rule by the many, we can call this the "expertise problem for democracy" (see e.g., Sunstein 2005) . But this label emphasizes only half of the problem. That is, it prioritizes expertise and problematizes democracy. It frames the issue as the need to change our democratic institutions so that they are sufficiently compatible with expertise. We could turn this label around, though, and talk about "the democracy problem for expertise": given that we are committed to democracy, how can we make expertise (or the practices of experts) more democratic (see, e.g., Kitcher 2001)? of course, there are other ways to put the problem and other fine-grained difficulties that arise with any answer to it. The papers in this issue of the Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal are located at this complex intersection of scientific expertise and democracy and originated as submissions to the inaugural Three Rivers Philosophy Conference at the University of South Carolina in April 2011. At the conference, philosophers of science, epistemologists, political philosophers, and others presented work that ranged from the theoretical and abstract down to the practical and concrete, and that spectrum is represented here.
The issue starts with an essay that takes up a question closer to the theoretical end of that spectrum. Any particular proposals about how to best reconcile democracy and scientific expertise will be for naught if the two are conceptually incompatible. Are they? According to Henry Richardson, one of the conditions of a well-ordered democracy is that democratic decisions arise from a process of "reasoning together." In the political operations of a modern society, reliance on experts in various contexts is unavoidable, and this means that in these contexts some parties to public deliberation will have knowledge that others lack and can make use of deliberative premises that others cannot. Richardson argues that public deliberation that involves this epistemic imbalance can still count as reasoning together, so long as the expert knowledge is in principle knowable by the public by some means other than the testimony of experts, a condition he calls "recoverability." He then takes up the question of how our political processes can be structured so as to give expertise sufficient power to be politically effective without sacrificing the rest of the public's freedom of reasoning. Here, Richardson explores ways we might ensure that the public holds some power to reverse expert decisions.
If democracy and scientific expertise are indeed compatible, we then face a number of more concrete questions about how to reconcile the two. Heather Douglas addresses head-on what we have called the democracy problem for expertise. Noting that efforts to synthesize and assess multiple sources and types of evidence are central to policy-relevant scientific research, she seeks to evaluate a range of different approaches to weighing evidence. She argues that an adequate approach should meet not only traditional epistemic goals such as completeness, rigor, and transparency but also democratic goals such as transparency, scope, and practicality. She concludes that a qualitative explanatory approach best meets her criteria and, in fact, most closely resembles general scientific reasoning.
[ 87 ]
The next two articles turn to an issue that has been particularly central to the recent literature on science and democracy, namely, how scientists should communicate with policy makers and members of the public about results that are uncertain or contested. Numerous authors have considered whether scientific experts ought to take the social context of their research into account when deciding whether to accept or reject policy-relevant hypotheses under uncertainty (see e.g., Douglas 2009; Jeffrey 1956; Rudner 1953; Wilholt 2009 ). one approach is for scientists to avoid accepting or rejecting hypotheses and to assess the probabilities of their hypotheses instead. The goal of doing so is to separate the epistemic task of assessing evidence or probabilities (which could be reserved for scientists) from the social task of assessing the values or utilities associated with the potential outcomes of decisions (which could be performed by policy makers and members of the public) (Elliott 2011, p. 67-68; Jeffrey 1956 ).
In his essay for this issue, Eric Winsberg argues that this strategy of isolating epistemic considerations from normative considerations when communicating scientific information is not always feasible. He uses climate modeling as a case study and points out that modelers are often forced to make methodological decisions that are laden with social values, because they must strike a balance between the inductive risks of overestimating or underestimating particular effects. Winsberg contends that, in order to eliminate the influences of these social values from their probability estimates, scientists would have to understand the various ways in which these values influenced their models. This is not feasible, though, because climate models are massive in size and complexity and the epistemic agency for creating the models is too widely distributed among individuals in time and space. Moreover, this opaqueness of climate models also hampers traditional approaches for responding to the value-ladenness of scientific practice, because scientists cannot easily perceive the presence of social values in their work or elicit public input on how to address these value judgments.
Given Winsberg's point that it is not always feasible to separate social values from the interpretation and communication of policy-relevant research, an important question is how to distinguish appropriate influences of these values from inappropriate influences. Kyle Powys Whyte and Daniel Steel address this question in their essay, which examines recent research on correlations between locally undesirable land uses and the race or income of nearby residents. They argue that Heather Douglas's (2009) strategy of distinguishing between direct and indirect influences of values [ 88 ] is difficult to apply in cases like theirs. Instead, they propose a "values-inscience" standard, which distinguishes epistemic from nonepistemic values and insists that nonepistemic values should not conflict with epistemic ones in the design, interpretation, or dissemination of scientific research.
The final paper in the volume brings us back to the expertise problem for democracy, but from a different angle. If the preceding papers are, in a sense, for political and scientific experts and the philosophers who seek an understanding of them, Brent Ranalli's essay addresses the problems of how lay people can participate responsibly and effectively in social and political discourse about which they lack the relevant technical expertise. How can they form an opinion about policy-relevant scientific matters if they do not know the science? Ranalli suggests that while the public might lack the skills to adjudicate complex scientific disputes, they are generally good judges of character. This provides a kind of shortcut: if we look for experts to display the right kinds of character traits, especially skepticism and disinterestedness, we will have a better sense of which of them to trust. Ranalli explores in detail how this emphasis on the character of experts plays out in disputes over global warming.
The idea of a robust deliberative democracy may in principle be compatible, under certain conditions, with some degree of deference to scientific or otherwise technical expertise. But there remain difficulties with realizing this compatibility in the real world. Some of these difficulties stem from the tendencies of politics and others from confusion or disagreement over the role different values should play in scientific practice. The papers in this issue can help us make progress toward overcoming these difficulties. That, at least, is our expert opinion. NoTES 1. For the sake of simplicity, we focus on government funding of science in this introduction, but the prevalence of private funding for science raises numerous additional problems related to expertise and democracy (see Elliott 2011). 2. A classic piece in this literature is Converse 1964 . See also Somin 1998. 3. And it is no response to claim that the public gets to choose its officials, who may in turn differentially affect science, if the public is ignorant about these differences. Choice alone is not sufficient for democracy.
